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ARTICLES
THE TENDER OFFER PINCH: A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
THE NEW YORK SECURITY
TAKEOVER DISCLOSURE ACT
The several states have a manifest interest in protecting their
residents and regulating the businesses incorporated under their
respective laws.' However, if this regulation impinges too severely
on interstate commerce, important constitutional issues are
raised.$ To protect these manifest interests, some states have en-
acted so-called anti-takeover statutes.3
Recently, New York enacted such legislation,' expressly in-
tending to avoid any constitutional infirmities.' This article will
attempt to evaluate the constitutional validity of New York's ex-
pansive disclosure requirements concerning tender offers. Part I
I See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir.), prob. juris.
noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 939 (S.D.
Ohio 1979); Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338, 344 (Del. Ch. 1980).
6 See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
8 See infra note 27.
' Ch. 915, §§ 1-6. [19851 N.Y. Laws 2414-31 (McKinney).
6 See Memorandum of the State Executive Department, reprinted in [1985] N.Y. Laws
3193 (McKinney).
* See ch. 915, § 4-1603(a)1-12, [1985] N.Y. Laws 2424-26 (McKinney). It should be
noted that § 2 of amended chapter 915 encourages any person to seek advance approval
from the board of directors of a New York domestic corporation for the purchase of vot-
ing stock which would entitle the acquirer to cast 20% or more of the votes entitled to be
cast in the election of directors of that corporation. Should the purchaser not seek this
advance approval, he may still acquire the securities, however, he could not thereafter en-
gage in any business combination with that resident domestic corporation for a period of
five years from the date he first acquired such 20% of the voting stock. See ch. 915, § 2-
912, [1985] N.Y. Laws 2414-22 (McKinney). Moreover, there are additional restrictions
placed upon the purchaser after the five year holding period has expired. Id. Arguably
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will offer an historical analysis of related federal regulation of
tender offers.7 Part II will discuss judicial evaluation of other state
anti-takeover statutes.8 Part III will analyze New York's anti-take-
over statute in light of relevant case law.
I. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS
A. Federal - The Williams Act
Subsequent to the economic boom of the 1960's, cash tender
offers"0 as a means of obtaining control of a business entity be-
came widespread.1" Intensive campaigns conducted for the tender
of stock at a fixed price were mounted, effectively removing a sub-
stantial number of corporate control contests from governmental
regulation under existing federal securities law.12 Due to this lack
such restrictions present serious constitutional issues. However, analysis of that section is
beyond the scope of this article.
7 See The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968); see infra notes 18-25
and accompanying text.
* See infra notes 34-73 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 73-125 and accompanying text.
'0 See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 54-57 (2d Cir. 1985). The typical
tender offer is a publicly made invitation, often announced in a newspaper advertisement,
soliciting all shareholders of a particular publicly owned corporation to tender their shares,
which are traded on a national securities exchange, for sale at a fixed price. Id. at 54. To
induce the sale, the price is generally substantially higher than the current market price.
Id. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1261 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). The offer is
made for a limited time and the offeror may seek to purchase all the outstanding shares or
a fixed minimum number of shares of the target company. Id. See generally H.R. REP'. No.
1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2811
(tender offer consists of a bid to buy shares of a company, usually at a price above current
market price) I hereinafter HousE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967)
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
Congress has consistently refused to define the term "tender offer." Rather, Congress
has delegated that responsibility to the courts and to the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) in order to maintain flexibility. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579,
598 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Takeover Bids: Hearings on H.R. 14475, S.
510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Financing of the House Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1968) (statement of Manuel Cohen, Chairman,
SEC). For a detailed analysis of cash tender offers as devices for securing corporate control,
see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2-10 (1973); Hayes
& Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 135 (1967).
" See SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2-4; HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2-4, re-
printed in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2812.
I See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2-4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2812-13. Prior to the 1960's, attempts to take over companies were usually imple-
mented through proxy solicitations, or exchange offers of securities, both of which were
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of regulation, the average stockholder was under a severe handi-
cap in deciding whether to tender his shares.1 3 Limitations on the
duration of the offer,14 restrictions on the number of shares gen-
erally sought1 and inadequate information disclosures by the
offeror" all contributed to defeat intelligent decisionmaking 7
Congress remedied this gap in the federal regulation of securities
through enactment of the Williams Act."'
The Williams Act requires tender offerors to file a statement1 '
regulated under existing federal law; cash tender offers, on the other hand, were not regu-
lated. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977). As noted by the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency: "[Bly using a cash tender offer the person seeking
control can operate in almost complete secrecy ... the law does not even require that he
disclose his identity, the source of his funds . . .. or what he intends to do if he gains
control of the corporation." HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2812.
18 See HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2812.
" See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1261 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). The typi-
cal tender offer provides for the opportunity to tender stock to remain open for a short
period, usually about two weeks. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250,1251-54 (1973). Certain tender
offers have been referred to as "Saturday Night Specials". A cash bid would come out on a
Saturday night and remain open for seven days, during which period shareholders would
stampede to sell their stock. See A. FLEISCHER, JR., TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND
PLANNING 65-66 (1981).
" See Note, supra note 14, at 1252. Offerors usually seek to purchase a pre-determined
percentage of outstanding stock. Id. The offer is generally conditioned upon the tender of
at least this percentage and if the number of shares tendered is less, the offeror is not
required to purchase any shares. Id. Similarly, if more than the requested number of shares
are tendered, the offeror is not required to buy the excess. Id.
19 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2812.
1 d. Absent knowledge of exactly who the tender offeror is, and what his plans are
regarding the takeover, the shareholder cannot reach an informed decision. Id.
19 The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (embodied in §§ 13(d),
13(e), 14(d), 14(e) and 14(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d), 78n(e), 78n() (1981) [hereinafter The Williams Act]. See Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (1982) (plurality opinion); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1. 22 (1977). The primary purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that
shareholders will have adequate information to decide whether to tender their stock to a
tender offeror. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
11 The Williams Act, supra note 18, at § 78m(d)(l). This section of the statute provides
that:
Any person who, after acquiring. .the beneficial ownership of any equity secur-
ity of a class which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title .... is .. .the
beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days after
such acquisition, send to the issuer of the security . . send to each exchange where
the security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement[.]
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with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosing infor-
mation with the intention of promoting informed decisionmaking
by the offeree.' The purpose of these disclosures is to protect the
investor shareholder.21 However, Congress determined that this
protection was to be afforded without favoring either incumbent
management or the takeover bidder.22 This policy of "even-
handedness" was illustrated by the protection bestowed upon the
Id. This document is commonly referred to as a Schedule 13D statement; see Hanson Trust
PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985). For an example of a Schedule 13D, see
A. FLEISCHER, JR.. supra note 14, at 698-714.
Furthermore, The Williams Act, supra note 18, at § 78n(d)(l) provides in part that it is
unlawful for any person to make a tender offer unless he has filed this statement containing
the information specified in the statute and "such additional information as the Commis-
sion may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors." Id. This statement is commonly referred to as a
Schedule 14D and may also be required to be filed by the issuer itself if it seeks to make a
tender offer for its own outstanding shares, depending on the local state statute. See A.
FLEISCHER. JR., supra note 14, at 106, 108, 110.
o See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). The statement that
must be filed with the SEC is to include information concerning the source and amount of
funds or other consideration to be used in purchasing the tendered shares, the extent of
the offeror's holdings in the target firm, and the offeror's plans regarding the target com-
pany's business or corporate structure. The Williams Act, supra note 18, at § 78m(dXl)(A).
The statute requires any group or person acquiring the beneficial ownership of more than
5% of the equity securities of certain issuers to file reports providing in part: "[T]he back-
ground and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the nature of such beneficial owner-
ship by, such person and all other persons by whom or on whose behalf the purchases have
been or are to be effected." Id.
Moreover, if the purpose of the purchases is to acquire control of the target the offeror
must include in his statement any plans or proposals he may have to liquidate the target or
to merge it with any other entity or any plans to make other major changes in the business
or corporate structure of the target. The Williams Act, supra note 18, at § 78m(dXl)(C).
See generally 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams listing all disclosure
requirements for tender offers).
" See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) (plurality opinion); Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); HousE REPORT, supra note 10, reprinted in 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2813-14.
" See MITE, 457 U.S. at 633 (plurality opinion). The disclosure provisions originally pro-
posed in Congress were pro-management. See Piper, 430 U.S. at 30. Congress subsequently
decided that takeover bids could serve a useful purpose. For example, they dissuade incum-
bent management from maintaining inefficient business practices. See HousE REPORT, supra
note 10, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2813. They also give sharehold-
ers an opportunity to sell their shares for a premium over market price. See 113 CONG. REC.
24,666 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits). As the legislation evolved, Congress embraced a
policy of neutrality between the tender offeror and incumbent management. See Rondeau,
422 U.S. at 58 (1975). Senator Williams, the sponsor of the Williams Act, stated that
"[Congress has] taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of manage-
ment or in favor of the person making the takeover bid." 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967).
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investor through the enactment of specific timing,' filing24 and
enforcement requirements25 governing tender offers.
B. State - Anti-Takeover Statutes
As the use of cash tender offers increased, a majority of states,
believing the federal regulatory scheme inadequate to protect
their interests," enacted their own legislation. These statutes
were written to afford further protection to shareholders residing
" The Williams Act, supra note 18, at § 78n(d)(5). Securities tendered pursuant to a
tender offer could be withdrawn by the offeree at any time until 7 days after the offer was
first published. Id. This 7 day withdrawal period has been extended to 15 business days by
the SEC. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(aX1) (1986). Furthermore, the depositor may withdraw
his shares after 60 days from the date of the original tender offer, unless otherwise prohib-
ited by the SEC. Id. The Williams Act also provides that when the number of shares ten-
dered exceeds the number of shares sought in the offer, those shares tendered during the
first 10 days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata basis. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(dX6)
(1981); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1986). See also The Williams Act, supra note 18, at §
78n(d)(7) (where any increase in consideration offered to holders of qualified stock is made
by offeror before expiration of offer, shareholders who tendered earlier at a lower price
must also receive the increase in the premium).
" See The Williams Act, supra note 18, at § 78n(d)(1). Upon commencement of a tender
offer, the offeror must file a statement reciting the information required to be divulged
under § 78n(dX1). See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. The date on which papers
are actually received by the Commission is the date of filing thereof. See 17 C.F.R. §§
240.0-3 (1986). The filing must be done as soon as practicable on the day of the com-
mencement of the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a) (1986). There is no require-
ment of advance notice to the target company. Id.
" See The Williams Act, supra note 18, at § 78n(e). This broad anti-fraud provision
makes it unlawful for any party engaged in a tender offer to make any untrue statement in
connection with the offer. Id. In addition, it is unlawful to state any misleading facts in, or
to omit a material fact from, the tender offer statement. Id. The statute also requires that
the SEC shall, by rules and regulations, define and prescribe means reasonably calculated
to prevent "such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." Id.
'" See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1282-83 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub noin. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). The
Kidwell court held that a state's interest in helping incumbent management would be valid
where it influenced "local lifestyle[s] through such means as charitable contributions or
civil involvement and the depth of its commitment to issues such as pollution control or job
safety." Id. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982), state representatives as-
serted two legitimate local purposes in support of their anti-takeover statute: to further
protect resident stockholders; and to regulate the internal affairs of companies incorpo-
rated within the state. Id. The latter was rejected, id. at 645, but the former was found to
constitute a legitimate local interest. Id. at 644. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text.
See Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and
Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981). Thirty-seven states have enacted takeover
legislation; many have been held unconstitutional and subsequently repealed or amended
to reflect the infirmities found by various courts. Id.
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in the respective states.28 The New York Security Takeover Dis-
closure Act (New York Disclosure Act)t 9 was drafted with the ad-
ditional interest in regulating the internal affairs of companies in-
corporated under New York law.3 The New York legislature
sought to avoid the adverse effects on the state and its citizens
from certain takeovers that are solely motivated by substantial and
immediate financial returns for the tender offeror31 Moreover,
the legislature noted that such takeover contests encourage defen-
sive tactics on the part of the target company that are aimed at
making the target less attractive"' and also have the effect of im-
s See MITE, 457 U.S. at 644: Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 566
(6th Cir. 1982): Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1283; Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 124 N.H. 1,
466 A.2d 919, 922 (1983).
" Ch. 915, § 4-1600-1613, 119851 N.Y. Laws 2422-31 (McKinney).
o See Memorandum of the State Executive Department, reprinted in [1985] N.Y. Laws
3184, 3189-90 (McKinney). State corporate law defines an investor's substantive rights as a
shareholder in certain transactions in the corporation's securities. See Sargent, supra note
27, at 724. A tender offer should be viewed as functionally equivalent to other methods of
altering corporate control which have traditionally been subject to state regulation under
its corporate law. Id. State takeover legislation can thus be considered merely a way of
regulating an attempt to secure a fundamental change in the corporate ownership and or-
ganization through a series of transactions between an offeror and the stockholders of the
corporation. Id.
" See Memorandum of the State Executive Department, reprinted in [1985] N.Y. Laws
3184, 3189 (McKinney). The New York legislature was concerned over a recent increase in
highly leveraged takeovers by offerors which resulted in liquidation of the target either
because of a substantial profit motive on the part of the offeror, or due to compelling
pressures on the offeror to liquidate by those who financed the takeover. Id. The legisla-
ture noted that these types of takeover contests rearrange ownership interests by substitut-
ing lenders for shareholders. Id. In this way, those who financed the takeover as underwrit-
ers would effectively have control of the corporation until the offeror paid off the
financing. Id. Therefore, as the traditional risk inherent in security investments shifted
from equity owners to creditors, the concurrent ownership interest would shift to the cred-
itors, who are far more concerned with immediate returns than with long-term growth. Id.
" Id. Incumbent management, concerned with the investor's interests, the continued in-
dependence of their corporation, and their own continued employment, have been ex-
tremely creative in developing new ways to fend off unwanted takeover offers. See Mathe-
son & Norberg, Hostile Share Acquisitions and Corporate Governance: A Framework for
Evaluating Antitakeover Activities, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 407, 409 (1986). These defensive and
prophylactic measures endorsed by target management in the face of a current or future
threat to corporate control have been the subject of much litigation, but a discussion of
those cases is beyond the scope of this note.
Some of the defensive gambits employed by incumbent management have been given
colorful terminology that reflect the effect of the defensive maneuver. See Responsibility of
Corporate Officers & Directors Under Federal Securities Laws, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No.
1178, at 69-71 (May 21, 1986). For example, the "poison pill" defense is designed to make
a takeover unpalatable, by making it prohibitively expensive "through issuance of a special
class of stock - the poison pill - which the offeror will have to 'swallow' if successful." Id.
Other terms given to efforts to combat takeover offers include: "sale of the crown jewels,"
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pairing the long-term potential of New York domestic corpora-
tions by restricting the ability of the affected business to grow.33
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY STATE REGULATION OF
TAKEOVERS - Edgar v. MITE Corp.
Many state statutes regulating cash tender offers were success-
fully challenged by takeover bidders as violative of the Suprem-
acy" and/or Commerce Clauses" of the United States Constitu-
tion." The Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp.37 held the
Illinois Business Take-Over Act (Illinois Act)" unconstitutional.3 '
While a plurality of the Court concluded that the Illinois Act was
where a corporation sells off its most coveted asset which had made the target attractive in
the first instance; "golden parachutes," which are lucrative severance packages for senior
management of a target company, payable if control changes hands through a hostile take-
over; the "pac-man" defense, whereby the target company makes a counter bid for the
stock of the original tender offeror; "greenmail," where the target pays a premium to the
bidder for its stock in the target and also demands that the bidder not repeat a tender
offer; "shark repellents," which involve amending a target company's by-laws to include a
fair price provision, thereby discouraging unsolicited offers: and finally, the use of a
"White Knight," where the target seeks out a friendly party to purchase its shares during a
hostile tender offer. Id. For an application of many of these defensive tactics, see Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
" See Memorandum of the State Executive Department, reprinted in [1985] N.Y. Laws
3189 (McKinney). While the legislature saw the benefits of certain tender offers as a check
on inefficient management, it was more concerned with tender offerors who, once gaining
control, divert funds from research, development, and capital expenditures to paying off
the acquisition debt. Id. at 3190.
" U.S. Cossr. art. VI, cl. 2. Article VI provides in part that: "This Constitution and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby . . ." Id.
" US. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. For a discussion of the Commerce Clause, see infra notes
56-59.
" See Annot., 73 L.Ed.2d 1454, 1457-59 (1982). Since 1982 many state takeover statutes
were found unconstitutional. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,
262-63 (7th Cir.) (Indiana control share acquistion statute unconstitutional), prob. juris.
noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986) Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565
(6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan takeover statute unconstitutional); National City Lines, Inc. v.
LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri takeover legislation uncon-
stitutional); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986) (Hawaii control share
acquisition statute unconstitutional); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(newly enacted Missouri takeover law unconstitutional); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland,
124 N.H. 1, 466 A.2d 919, 922 (1983) (New Hampshire takeover act unconstitutional). But
see Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984) (Minnesota takeover
statute constitutional).
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
" ILL Rzv. STAT. ch. 1211/t, § 137.52-9 (1979) (repealed 1983).
"MITE, 457 U.S. at 646.
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preempted by the Williams Act, 40 and constituted an invalid direct
regulation of interstate commerce,' a majority held the Illinois
Act invalid as posing an excessive indirect burden on interstate
commerce."
A. Preemption
The plurality in MITE found that Congress did not expressly
preempt state regulation of corporate takeovers.' Earlier Su-
preme Court decisions had upheld state legislation aimed at regu-
lating intrastate investment ventures. 4 The validity of these "blue-
sky" laws,"4 coupled with congressional failure to amend the Se-
', MITE, 457 U.S. at 637-40 (plurality opinion). There is no single, straightforward
formula that can summarize the analysis necessary to determine whether a state statute is
void under the Supremacy Clause. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). However,
the Supreme Court has established some guidelines and summarized them in Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
The first inquiry made is whether Congress has expressly declared its intent to preclude
the states from a specific area of regulation. Id. at 525. If such a finding of congressional
intent is made, a court will hold the state statute preempted on that ground alone. Id. See
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947), holding that the Federal Ware-
house Act expressly preempted all concurrent state regulation. Id.
A court may also find that, while no express exclusion of state regulation is evident, a
preemptive intent may be inferred based on the pervasive nature of the federal legislative
scheme. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 525. If the federal legislation is incompatible with similar
state legislation, see Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973), or if
the state statutes "touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant," see Rice, 331
U.S. at 230, then the federal system has presumably excluded enforcement of the state law
on the same subject. See id.
Preemptive intent must be found if compliance with both the federal and state legislation
is a "physical impossibility", even in the absence of any express or implied congressional
intent to exclude state regulation. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
Even in the absence of congressional intent to exclude state regulation, or in the absence
of any direct conflict of legislation, a finding of preemption will be made if "under the
circumstances of [the] particular case, [the state's] law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines, 312 U.S.
at 67. This inquiry requires the court to consider the relationship between federal and
state laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as written. See Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); accord De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
11 MITE, 457 U.S. at 643 (plurality opinion). See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying
text.
4" MITE, 457 U.S. at 643-46.
's Id. at 631 (plurality opinion).
44 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
" See id. States have an interest in regulating "speculative schemes which have no more
basis than so many feet of blue sky." Id. Blue-sky laws are state statutes providing for the
regulation and supervision of securities offerings and sales, to protect citizens from invest-
ing in fraudulent companies. See 69 AM. Jut. 2D, Securities Regulation - State §§ 1-4 (1973).,
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curities Exchange Act of 1934,46 prompted the MITE plurality to
find that the Williams Act did not expressly nor impliedly pre-
empt state regulation of tender offers.47
However, the plurality identified three provisions of the Illinois
Act that served as obstacles to full implementation of the congres-
sional purpose of the Williams Act. 8 Compliance with the Illinois
Act resulted in advance notice of the tender offer to the
target company. 4" This advance notification enabled incumbent
management to employ delay tactics'0 through a hearing pro-
They are limited to purely intrastate transactions. Id. Such statutes have generally been
held not to violate federal or state constitutions because any burden on interstate com-
merce is only incidental. See Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); Caldwell
v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S.
539 (1917).
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 903 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1981)). The Act expressly states that Congress had
no intention to preempt state regulation of security transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1981). In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1982), the plurality noted that in
enacting the Williams Act, Congress did not amend § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1981). Section 28(a) provides that "nothing in
this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the Securities Commission or any agency or officer
performing like functions of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not
conflict with the provisions of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder." Id. This
provision was designed to allow state blue-sky regulation. See Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 n.13 (1979).
"MITE, 457 U.S. at 631 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 634. Determining whether a state statute stands as an obstacle to full implemen-
tation of the congressional purpose of federal legislation requires a two-step process. The
court must first construe both the state and federal statutes, and then reach a determina-
tion as to whether there in fact exists a conflict. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644
(1971). Furthermore, it is imperative that the court distinguish between those situations
where there is a mere possibility of a conflict arising, and those "where conflicts will neces-
sarily arise." See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973) (emphasis in original).
For this reason it must be evident that both the federal and the state legislation cannot, of
necessity, stand together.
41 See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 1211/s, §§ 137.54E, - .54B) (1979) (repealed 1983). This provi-
sion of the Illinois Act required a tender offeror to notify the Illinois Secretary of State
and the target company of his intent to make a tender offer, and the material terms
thereof, twenty business days before the offer was to become effective. Id. During that time
the offeror was not to communicate its offer to the stockholders, but the target company
was free to disseminate any information concerning the impending offer to its sharehold-
ers. Id.
The Williams Act has no precommencement notification provision and Congress, on sev-
eral different occasions, has refused to impose such a requirement. See MITE, 457 U.S. at
635-36 (plurality opinion). Precommencement notification was viewed as a powerful
weapon with which incumbent management could combat tender offers, perhaps to the
detriment of the investor; Congress determined that this should be avoided. Id.
" Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 10 n.8, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
According to the SEC, delay or advance notice to the target company could provide incum-
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vision.0 1 Moreover, the Illinois Act provided for the Secretary of
State to rule on the substantive fairness of the offer."" Since these
provisions did not serve to protect the investor,5 but would
merely entrench incumbent management often to the detriment
bent management with extra time that might enable the target to: "(I) repurchase its own
securities: (2) announce dividend increases or stock splits; (3) issue additional shares of
stock: (4) acquire other companies to produce an anti-trust violation should the tender of-
fer succeed: (5) arrange a defensive merger: (6) enter into restrictive loan agreements; and
(7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer." Id. Moreover, the delay could afford
the target the opportunity to implement a defensive maneuver. Id. See supra note 32. The
target company could effectively reduce the value of the security to the tender offeror,
thereby forcing him to reduce his offer to the stockholder or resulting in the offeror's
decision to retract the offer entirely, all to the investor's detriment. See MITE, 457 U.S. at
639-40 n.14 (plurality opinion): Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277
(5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nomn. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979): National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1130-31 (8th Cir.
1982). See Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 238 (1977).
Although delay tactics are generally viewed as contrary to an investor's best interests,
some commentators believe delay can be beneficial to the investor. For example, it has
been suggested that the time pressures of responding to a tender offer distract the investor
and impede informed decisionmaking. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 218-19 (1977). Another commentator
has suggested that delay tactics benefit the investor by increasing the price of his security
both through the tender offer and on the open market. See Note, Securities Law and the
Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 523-25 (1979).
" See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 1211/s, §§ 137.57A & B (1979) (repealed 1983). These provi-
sions allowed the Illinois Secretary of State to call a hearing, with respect to any tender
offer subject to the statute, for a determination of compliance therewith. Id. Pursuant to
the Illinois Act, the offer could not proceed until the hearing was completed, and there was
no deadline for the completion of the hearing. See id. §§ 137.57A, B, C, D. Although the
Secretary was to render a decision on the validity of the offer within 15 days of the hear-
ing, that period could have been extended indefinitely. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 (plurality
opinion). The MITE plurality stated that these provisions frustrated the congressional pur-
pose of the Williams Act. Id. at 637-39 (plurality opinion).
Furthermore, any party who was located in Illinois holding at least 10% of any class of
equity securities which were the subject of a takeover offer could request a hearing. See ILL
REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.57A (1979) (repealed 1983). Upon such a request, the Secre-
tary was required to call a hearing. Id. The MITE plurality noted that often incumbent
management will control, directly or indirectly, 10% of a target company's shares. See
MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 (plurality opinion). These provisions may afford incumbent manage-
ment an undue advantage by creating an opportunity to delay an offer. Id. See supra note
50 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 51. See also MITE, 457 U.S. at 639-40 (plurality opinion) (Illinois Act,
requiring Secretary to deny registration to tender offer if he found the bid inequitable,
preempted because legislative history of Williams Act indicated that Congress intended in-
vestors to be free to make their own decisions; commonly referred to as the "market
approach").
" MITE, 457 U.S. at 639-40 (plurality opinion). But see supra note 50 (under certain
conditions delay may benefit investor).
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of the investor," the Illinois Act did not maintain the congres-
sional policy of evenhandedness and was preempted by the Wil-
liams Act.as
B. Commerce Clause
The Constitution directly empowers Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce." This grant, however, does not entirely preclude
states from regulating in this field.5 7 Direct regulation of inter-
state commerce by the states is prohibited," but a state's inciden-
tal regulation of interstate commerce will be permitted if it fur-
thers some legitimate state interest and is not outweighed by the
burden imposed on such commerce."
" MITE, 457 U.S. at 639-40 (plurality opinion).
" Id. at 637-39 (plurality opinion).
." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have
the power . . . [tjo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States[.]" Id. The Commerce Clause emerged from the Constitutional Convention as a re-
sponse to the bitter trade wars that existed between the states under the Articles of Con-
federation. See Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1337-41 (1934). These trade wars resulted from states enacting tariff measures on
the importation of goods from other states. Id. As more states adopted reciprocal levies,
development of interstate business was hampered and antagonism among the states in-
creased. Id. The Convention, recognizing the need for centralized commercial regulation,
granted Congress broad power to regulate trade or business. Id. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTTrUTIONAL LAw 321 (1978); C. SWIsHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVEL-
OPMENT 25-27 (2d ed. 1954).
Limits exist upon state power to regulate commerce over which Congress has primary
responsibility. See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976) (quot-
ing Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)). Some limits are expressly found in the
Constitution, such as the prohibition on state imposition of an export duty, U.S. CoNST. art.
1, § 9, cl. 5, and limits on the state right to engage in foreign trade. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10,
cl. 2. However, in most areas concerning interstate commerce, the Constitution does not
expressly address whether the states may exercise similar power as Congress in the area. See
L. TRIBE, supra, at 321. This grey area, known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause, has
been the subject of Supreme Court interpretation. See id.
" See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 140 (1973). It
is well established that "the National Government's power, under the Commerce Clause, to
regulate commerce does not exclude all state power of regulation." Id.; Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362
U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). A state can sometimes affect interstate commerce in the exercise of
its police powers to regulate areas of local concern. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978).
" See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080,
2084 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (plurality opinion); Shafer v.
Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925).
- See MITE, 457 U.S. at 643; Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
In Philadelphia, the city of Philadelphia sought the invalidation of a New Jersey statute
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1. Direct Regulation
A state statute which directly regulates transactions that occur
across state lines is strictly prohibited regardless of the legislative
purpose." In Edgar v. MITE Corp., a four-member plurality" de-
termined that the Illinois Act was a direct regulation of interstate
commerce." The plurality observed that provisions within the
statute allowed Illinois to directly suspend a tender offer even
when a target company's shareholders were all out-of-state resi-
dents, thus giving the statute a "sweeping extraterritorial ef-
fect."'6 Distinguishing a state's blue-sky laws," the plurality noted
that the Illinois Act directly regulated tender offers occurring en-
tirely outside the State of Illinois."
which prohibited the importation of waste into the state which had been collected outside
its borders. Id. In striking down the statute as violative of the Commerce Clause, the Court
recognized that certain incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be unavoidable in
the area of state regulatory measures directed at the safety and health of its citizenry. Id.;
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). In Pike, a cantaloupe grower challenged the order of
an Arizona state official which prohibited the grower from shipping its cantaloupes outside
the state unless packed in a manner so as to identify their Arizona origin. Id. at 144. This
would have required the grower to construct a packing plant in Arizona at a cost of
$200,000. Id. at 140. In finding the Arizona order unconstitutional, the Court noted the
state's interest was tenuous in relation to the burden such order imposed on interstate
commerce. Id. at 145.
" Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925). A direct regulation of inter-
state commerce is prohibited "regardless of the purpose for which it was enacted." Id.
" Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J.,
Stevens & O'Connor, JJ.). Justice Powell joined the aforementioned Justices to form the
majority opinion of the Court, holding the Illinois Act in violation of the Commerce
Clause under the Pike test. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. Three of the Jus-
tices (White, Blackmun & Burger, JJ.) also thought the Illinois Act was preempted by the
Williams Act. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall, joined by
Justice Brennan, and Justice Rehnquist filed dissenting opinions, regarding the matter as
moot and did not express an opinion on the merits. See MITE, 457 U.S. at 655-67.
" Id. at 642.
" Id. at 642-43. The Illinois Act provided that any tender offer for the stock of a target
company had to be registered with the Illinois Secretary of State. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 1211/2,
§ 137.54A (1979) (repealed 1983). The Illinois Act defined a target company as a corpora-
tion of which 10% of the outstanding shares were held by Illinois residents or that met two
of three other conditions: (a) had its principal executive office in Illinois; (b) was organized
under the laws of Illinois; (c) had at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus repre-
sented in Illinois. Id. § 137.52-10. Illinois therefore could apply its statute "to regulate a
tender offer which would not affect a single Illinois shareholder." MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
" See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
" MITE, 457 U.S. at 641 (plurality opinion). The plurality found that the Illinois Act
"directly regulateld] transactions which (took] place across state lines . .. wholly outside
the State of Illinois." Id. Moreover, the plurality asserted that blue-sky laws only regulate
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2. Indirect Regulation
The majority in MITE held that under the test enunciated in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,"6 the Illinois Act was an unconstitutional
indirect burden on interstate commerce.17 In Pike, the Court es-
sentially required balancing the statute's benefits to state residents
against the burdens it imposed on interstate commerce." If the
statute imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce in re-
lation to the local putative benefits, the statute will be deemed
unconstitutional."°
The Court in MITE balanced the burdens of the Illinois Act in
intrastate transactions, and that such laws "' 'affect interstate commerce in [securities] only
incidentally'. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 1242 U.S. 539,1 557-58 1(1917)]." Id.
" 397 U.S. 137 (1970). See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
U Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The origin of the balancing test has been traced to Justice
Stone's dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting),
which was elaborated upon in Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. Rv.
1, 19-28 (1940). See generally, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
269-71 (3d Ed. 1986) (discussion of Justice Stone's dissent in Di Santo and Dowling's
formulation).
o" Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The rule as stated in Pike is:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public in-
terest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. (citations omitted). In conjunction with the balancing test the Court has often looked to
whether the state could have achieved its objective through means less restrictive upon
interstate commerce. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). In Dean
Milk, the Court applied this "lesser means" test to strike down a City of Madison ordinance
which restricted the sale of milk that had not been pasteurized within five miles of the city.
Id. at 354. The Court found that Madison's interest could have been accomplished through
less restrictive alternatives, such as sending its inspectors to out-of-state milk producers, or
by relying on available federal standards. Id. at 354-55. See also Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co.
v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 376-78 (1976) (Court suggested state adopt its own milk inspec-
tion standard as less restrictive means compared to state's unconstitutional reciprocal milk
statute).
Since 1970, the rule enunciated in Pike has been the standard by which courts have mea-
sured state regulatory schemes that affect interstate commerce. See Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). Raymond Motor involved a Wisconsin statute
which prohibited trucks over a certain length from using its highways. Id. at 432. In its
analysis of the statute, the Court weighed the purported safety interest of the state against
the burden imposed upon interstate commerce. Id. at 442. The Court found no actual
evidence of increased safety, and therefore struck down the statute as unconstitutional. Id.
at 447. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. :SHRIFFRIN, THE AMERICAN CONSTITu-
TIoN 220 (6th ed. 1986).
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its ability to prevent tender offers from proceeding outside the
state,' against the two local interests which the statute purported
to further: 1) protection of Illinois resident stockholders; and 2)
the regulation of the internal affairs of businesses incorporated
within Illinois.71 While the Court recognized the protection of res-
ident shareholders as a legitimate interest, the Court found the
statute to be flawed since it governed out-of-state transactions
over which Illinois had no interest.72 As to the internal affairs doc-
trine, the majority found it to be a conflict of laws principle which
had no bearing on tender offers.'a
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK
DISCLOSURE Acr
A. Preemption Analysis
The New York Disclosure Act was drafted in light of the MITE
decision. 7' It contains none of the provisions of the Illinois Act
which were found constitutionally infirm by the MITE plurality.
There is no precommencement notification provision, no hearing
provision, and no section authorizing the state representative
charged with the enforcement of the statute to rule on the sub-
stantive fairness of the tender offer.75 However, the New York
to Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982).
I ld. at 644.
,Id. at 643-46.
" Id. at 645.
14 See Memorandum of the State Executive Department, reprinted in [1985] N.Y. Laws
3193 (McKinney).
7* See ch. 915, § 4-1600-1613, [19851 N.Y. Laws 2422-31 (McKinney). The New York
Disclosure Act has no precommencement provisions. See ch. 915, § 4-1602(a), 1985] N.Y.
Laws 2424 (McKinney). The tender offeror must file his registration statement as soon as
practicable on the date of the commencement of the takeover bid. Id. The same require-
ment is found in the Williams Act. See supra note 24. Compare ILL Rzv. STAT. ch. 121V, §§
137.52-59 (1979) (repealed 1983) (precommencement notification provision, hearing provi-
sion, and provision providing for state representative to rule on substantive fairness of
offer).
There is no hearing provision in the New York Disclosure Act, but the Attorney Gen-
eral, the official charged with the enforcement of the statute, may conduct an investigation
concerning the takeover bid if he deems it necessary. See ch. 915, § 4-1604(a), [1985] N.Y.
Laws 2427 (McKinney). The purpose of such an investigation is limited to a determination
of compliance with the requirements of the Act. Id. Similarly, there is no provision in the
New York Disclosure Act providing for the Attorney General to rule on the substantive
fairness of the offer as there was in the Illinois Act. See ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 1212, § 137.57E
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Disclosure Act does require substantial disclosure of information
concerning the tender offer and the takeover bidder which is be-
yond the scope of the disclosure mandated by the Williams Act. 70
It is submitted that the New York Disclosure Act would not be
preempted by the Williams Act because of these required addi-
tional disclosures.
It is further submitted that the MITE Court, as evidenced by the
plurality decision, did not purport to require the states to enact
legislation evenhandedly without exception, and thereby establish
new rights for tender offerors."7 Rather, not tipping the scales in
(1979) (repealed 1983).
The New York Attorney General is given subpoena power to conduct these compliance
hearings. See ch. 915, § 4-1604(a), [19851 N.Y. Laws 2427 (McKinney). This provision, as
written, is arguably overbroad and vague since it does not restrict the documents which
may be subjected to investigation. Id. Judicial construction of the statute should correct any
such infirmities. For example, in Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.
1984), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a provision in the Minnesota
Corporate Take-Over Act that required the offeror to disclose "such additional informa-
tion as the the commissioner [may] by rule prescribe" was unconstitutional. Id. at 914. The
court concluded that the section was vague and could require the disclosure of confusing
or irrelevant information and might require judgmental data that the Commissioner had
no right to demand. Id. While the provision in the New York Disclosure Act is narrower
than the infirm section of the Minnesota statute, it is susceptible to an overbroad reading
and should be tailored by judicial construction to include only information clearly relevant
to the tender offer.
" Compare ch. 915, § 4-1603(a)1-12, 119851 N.Y. Laws 2424-26 (McKinney) with 15
U.S.C. § 78m(dXIXA)-(E), (2), (5) (1981) and 15 U.S.C. § 78n(dXl) (1981). The New York
Disclosure Act requires disclosures of extensive additional information that includes:
A statement as to the potential impact, if any, of the offeror's plans or proposals on
the residents of New York state, including any material change in the location of the
target company's offices or business activities within this state ...any significant
reduction in the workforce . .. any other material change in the .. .conditions of
employment of persons employed by the target company in this state; any material
change in the relationships of the target company with suppliers or customers within
this state, or any other material changes in the target company's business, corporate
structure, management, personnel or activities which would have a substantial im-
pact on residents of this state...
Ch. 915, § 4-1603(aX9), [1985] N.Y. Laws 2425 (McKinney). In addition, particulars as to
adjustments to any pension or profit sharing plans must be disclosed, as well as a vast array
of labor relations records, including all violations of federal labor laws adjudicated or set-
tled within five years of the commencement of the tender offer. Id. § 4-1603(a)(10). If the
offeror is a natural person, he or she must reveal financial statements for the current and
preceding three years that include a description of his business activities during that time
period and a description of any pending legal or administrative proceedings to which the
offeror is a party. Id. There are numerous additional disclosures required by the statute.
See id.
See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 655 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at
646-47 (Powell, J., concurring). As Justice Powell noted, headquarters of the large multina-
tional corporations tend to be situated in the major cities of just a few states. Id. at 646.
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favor of either incumbent management or the takeover bidder
was essential only insofar as it furthered investor protection. 74
Language in the concurring opinion suggests that it is appropriate
to legislate in favor of incumbent management if it furthers the
goal of investor protection.7
Often, a takeover of smaller corporations located elsewhere will result in moving the cor-
porate headquarters to these large metropolitan centers. Id. The loss of the company may
have a significant adverse effect on the state or locality that lost the company. Id. Besides
the potential loss of management personnel, many of whom have been civic minded and
responsible for community leadership, contributions to all facets of a community may di-
minish. Id. This could result in concomitant losses of leadership and financial support to
cultural, charitable and educational life within the community. Id.
It is often the case that tender offerors possess both capital and experienced takeover
personnel far superior to those of the target company. This disparity may seriously disad-
vantage a regional company in combatting a tender offer. d. at 646. If there is no express
or implied preemption of state takeover legislation by the Williams Act, see id. at 631, then
it is submitted that there must be room to enact a regulatory scheme that may encompass
additional protections for incumbent management.
Similarly, it is proposed that an investor stockholder often will have overlapping interests
with the target company and incumbent management. These interests include maintaining
all the cultural, charitable and employment advantages that businesses provide to any local-
ity in which it is situated. Concurrently, if the stockholder also resides in that same locality,
or is an employee of a target company, legislation that may discourage tender offers but
maintains the status quo may further protect the shareholder. Thus, allowing state regula-
tion designed to further protect the investor can also work to protect incumbent
management.
Many cases stand for the proposition that evenhandedness is not imperative. See, e.g.,
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1036 (1st Cir. 1982) (MITE cannot
stand for general proposition that there is broad preemption principle under which state
regulation of takeover bids would have to be invalidated); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse,
482 F. Supp. 929, 936-37 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Williams Act did not intend to create affirma-
tive regulatory neutrality between tender offeror and incumbent management). Cf. Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977). In Piper, the Court noted that "Con-
gress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for control, but its policy of
evenhandedness does not go ... to the purpose of the legislation." Id. at 29. The share-
holders of the target company are the intended beneficiaries of the Williams Act. Id. It is
the protection of their interests to which a court must look and not to whether the legisla-
tion protects both contestants equally. Id.
The MITE plurality stated that Congress intended to embrace a policy of neutrality be-
tween the tender offeror and incumbent management and neither side "should be ex-
tended additional advantages vis-a-vis the investor. .. " See MITE, 457 U.S. at 633 (plural-
ity opinion). See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261 (7th Cir.), prob.
juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558,
565-66 (6th Cir. 1982); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128-33
(8th Cir. 1982).
10 See supra note 77. As Justice Powell opined, "the Williams Act's neutrality policy does
not necessarily imply a congressional intent to prohibit state legislation designed to assure -
at least in some circumstances - greater protection to interests that include but often are
broader than those of incumbent management." MITE, 457 U.S. at 646-47 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
" Id.
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By burdening the tender offeror with additional disclosure obli-
gations8" that may be difficult for him to comply with, the New
York Disclosure Act may seem to favor incumbent management
and yet further investor protection. The New York Disclosure Act
may favor incumbent management in that failure to comply with
the disclosure requirements can result in the suspension of a
tender offer. 1 It would protect the investor by giving him addi-
tional information on how the takeover will affect the community,
particularly in terms of employment opportunities.82 Since state
regulation of tender offers was neither expressly nor impliedly
preempted by the Williams Act, there must exist some permissible
boundaries within which Congress thought states may legislate. It
is submitted that state legislation designed merely to provide addi-
tional information to the investor falls within this non-preempted
zone." It necessarily follows that an investor with additional infor-
mation, which he may or may not consider, is at least as well pro-
tected as an investor who is not furnished with that information."
" See ch. 915, § 4-1603(a) 1-12, 11985] N.Y. Laws 2427 (McKinney); supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
*1 Ch. 915, § 4-1604(b), J1985] N.Y. Laws 2427 (McKinney). The N.Y. Attorney Gen-
eral is empowered to seek a temporary or permanent injunction against the tender offeror
for failure to comply with the disclosure requirements. Id.
" See supra note 77.
" Cf Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 909-12 (8th Cir. 1984) (Minne-
sota disclosure statute, with similar disclosure provisions as the New York Disclosure Act,
not preempted by Williams Act).
" Id. See also Edudata v. Scientific Computers, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Minn. 1984)
(disclosure of additional information conforms to congressional purpose of Williams Act to
protect investor). But see Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979). In Kidwell, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that "[d]isclosure of a
mass of irrelevant data can confuse the investor and obscure relevant disclosures." Id. The
court noted that that would be inconsistent with the Williams Act's goal of investor protec-
tion. Id. Furthermore, the Kidwell court concluded that Congress had delegated to the SEC
the task of specifying what information was material to an investor considering a tender
offer. Id. at 1281. That judgment is a legislative one and a state effort to second-guess that
judgment could not stand. Id. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 175 (1963) (White, J., dissenting). Cf. T.S.C. Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 448 (1976) (excessive disclosure requirements pursuant to state proxy solicitation reg-
ulation "may accomplish more harm than good" by confusing shareholders). That result
would conflict with the objectives of the Williams Act to permit an unfettered decision by
an investor. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1131-32 (8th Cir.
1982).
It is the authors' contention that the statutes litigated in those earlier cases are distin-
guishable from the New York Disclosure Act. All of the statutes adjudicated as invalid had
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Moreover, when an investor is also an employee of the target,
that investor may have a greater interest in the tender offeror's
plans regarding future employment policies." Viewed in this
light, disclosures pursuant to the New York Disclosure Act are in
no way inconsistent with the purpose of the disclosure require-
ments under federal law," and serve to protect the unique inter-
ests of New York shareholders. 7 Therefore, it is suggested that
the extensive disclosure requirements of the New York Disclosure
Act do not so conflict with the purpose of the Williams Act to
warrant a finding of preemption."
provisions that the MITE plurality found to be preempted by the Williams Act so that,
when coupled with additional disclosure requirements, the statute created such an overall
burdensome package for the tender offeror that the overwhelming effect was to hurt the
investor. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The mere requirement of providing
additional information, standing alone, is not so onerous a burden that it would necessarily
discourage a tender offeror, nor aid incumbent management to any significant degree.
Moreover, the courts that addressed the additional information provisions have used specu-
lative terms when making statements concerning the effects of those provisions. Additional
information "may" or "can" work to the investor's disadvantage. However, this is not nec-
essarily so. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 914 (8th Cir. 1984).
See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). As an
illustration, justice Powell pointed out that an employee investor may be asked to move if a
takeover results in moving corporate headquarters to another locality. Id. It is often the
case that an employee of a target company will also be an investor based on a profit-sharing
plan. Cf. 19 Business Organizations, YOUNG, PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS §
502131[b], at 5-17, -18 (discussing tax deductibility of corporate distribution of stock to
employees pursuant to a profit-sharing plan).
'See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 914 (8th Cir. 1984).
" Id.
" See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973).
The Supreme Court has stated that, if possible, the proper approach when considering
preemption is to reconcile the operation of the federal and state statutory schemes. Id. A
mere possibility of a state-federal conflict is not sufficient to justify preemption. See Agency
Rent-A-Car v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1038 (1st Cir. 1982). As the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit wrote: "[The] Supreme Court cases of the last decade demonstrate a new
solicitude toward state interests and an elevation of the threshold of conflict required
before a state statute is preempted." Id. Furthermore, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
noted:
[T]here is support on the Court for acceptance of what amounts virtually to a strong
presumption against preemption, based on two factors: diffusion of power to the
states is said to further democracy, and a finding of no preemption is regarded as
preferable because Congress can overrrule it by appropriate legislation, while a find-
ing of preemption cannot be changed by the states.
Id.
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B. Commerce Clause Analysis
1. Direct Regulation
In response to the Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., New
York amended provisions of the New York Disclosure Act to re-
quire compliance only where both the offerees and the target
company are residents of the state.69 Furthermore, the New York
Disclosure Act, as amended, now implies that any suspension of a
tender offer would only apply to New York resident sharehold-
ers." Implicit in this framework is that the statute could not di-
rectly prevent a cash tender offer from proceeding elsewhere if
the target company had no New York resident shareholders. 1 It
See ch. 915, § 4-1601(a), 119851 N.Y. Laws 2423 (McKinney). The statute defines an
"offeree" as: "the beneficial owner, residing in this state, of securities which an offeror ac-
quires or offers to acquire in connection with a takeover bid." Id. § 4-1601(c) (emphasis
added).
The New York Disclosure Act defines a "target company" as "a corporation, organized
under the laws of this state and having its principal executive offices or significant business
operations located within this state." Id. § 4-1601(d).
Under the New York Disclosure Act, the definition of a tender offer is narrowly tailored
to incorporate the two aforementioned definitions. A "takeover bid" is defined as:
the acquisition of or offer to acquire by an offeror from an offeree, pursuant to a
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, any equity security of a target com-
pany, if after acquisition thereof the offeror would, directly or indirectly, be a bene-
ficial owner of more than five percent of any class of the issued and outstanding
equity securities of such target company.
Id. § 4-1601(a).
"* See ch. 915, §4-1604(b), 19851 N.Y. Laws 2427 (McKinney). The statute provides that
if the Attorney General feels an offeror is going to, or has violated the New York Disclos-
ure Act's provisions, he can obtain an injunction temporarily or permanently barring that
person from making or taking part in or continuing a takeover bid or from taking up or
paying for shares tendered by offerees pursuant to a takeover bid, and the court may grant.
the relief applied for or so much thereof as it may deem proper. Id. (emphasis added).
"Offerees" only include New York resident shareholders, so the injunction would only af-
fect the shares of New York residents. See supra note 89.
91 See supra notes 89-90. It is suggested that by way of the MITE plurality, the litmus test
of whether a state's takeover statute imposes a direct burden on interstate commerce is in
the statute's ability to suspend the tender offer as to out-of-state shareholders. See Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion). Such a focus by the MITE plu-
rality leads the writers to believe that since the New York Disclosure Act provides that any
suspension of a tender offer would only apply to New York resident shareholders, the stat-
ute avoids any direct regulation of interstate commerce. But see Dynamics Corp. of Am. v.
CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986). In Dy-
namics, Judge Posner seemed to view any act of state regulation that impacts on the "inter-
state market in securities and corporate control" as one which should be precluded on the
Anti-Takeover Statute
is submitted, therefore, that on these facts the New York Disclos-
ure Act successfully avoids a direct regulation of interstate
commerce.
2. Indirect Regulation
While not interfering directly with interstate commerce, it is
suggested that the New York Disclosure Act is invalid as it indi-
rectly imposes significant burdens on interstate transactions which
far outweigh any local benefits that the statute may provide.
While New York does have a legitimate interest in protecting
New York resident shareholders," it is submitted that this interest
does not outweigh the burdens which the statute imposes on inter-
state commerce. The extensive disclosure requirements mandated
by the statute may have the general effect of discouraging tender
offers.93 When tender offers are made more difficult, the market
for corporate control can be crippled, 4 and the allocation of cor-
basis that such an act is a direct and substantial regulation of interstate commerce. Id. It is
the authors' contention that a statute's effect on the market for corporate control should
be but one factor to weigh in an analysis of its indirect effect on interstate commerce.
" Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in [19851 N.Y. Laws 3193
(McKinney). Cf. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) (protecting resident
shareholders is a legitimate state interest).
" See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 758 (S.D. Ohio), aff d, 796
F.2d 135 (6th Cir.), appeal docketed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 85-344);
Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (W.D. Mo. 1985). It would seem clear that greater
costs, resulting from increased regulation, decrease the number of takeover bids. Id. See
also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 386 (3d ed. 1986) (regulation of bids makes
tender offers more costly to mount, so fewer will be made); Special Report: SEC Advisory
Committee on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No.
1028, at 71 (July 15, 1983) (same) [hereinafter Special Report]; Fischel, Efficient Capital
Market Theory, The Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57
TEx. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1978) (same).
See Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir.), prob. juris.
noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986); lcahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (W.D. Mo. 1985);
Fischel, supra note 93, at 28-29; Jarrel & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State
Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 371, 381 (1980).
Integral to an understanding of the market for corporate control is that in an efficient
capital market, with information equally available to all, a stock's price quickly and accu-
rately reflects its true value. See Fischel, supra note 93, at 1, 3. One component of a stock's
price is the firm's incumbent management. See id. at 1, 5. The better the quality of incum-
bent management, the higher the stock's price. See id. at 2, 5. Conversely, a lower price will
be reflected in a company's stock where poor management is in control. See id. at 5. The
market for corporate control is the "efficient mechanism whereby control shifts from less
capable managers to others who can manage corporate assets more profitably." Id. Cash
tender offers are particularly well suited to accomplishing this shift. See id. at 7. For excel-
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porate resources to their highest valued uses may be discour-
aged.' 5 Such effects impede the free market economy," and leave
incumbent management with no incentive to perform well.91
Furthermore, it is submitted that any possible short-term pro-
tection afforded to local investors is outweighed by the future
harm forseeably caused by the statute. Long-term investment in
New York companies would be discouraged by the increased cost
and uncertainties of investing." Additionally, the statute's effect
of promoting burdensome litigation, as well as increasing the in-
vestment of both time and money by the tender offeror, would
discourage future bidders from attempting takeovers."
lent background material on the market for corporate control and efficient markets, see
generally J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-97
(1973). Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110.(1965).
See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982) (citing Easterbrook & Fischel,
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1161, 1173-74 (1981)); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Special
Report, supra note 93, at 76: Fischel, supra note 93, at 5, 27-28, 45.
" Cf Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1983). In Telvest, expert testi-
mony was offered to show Virginia's Take-Over Disclosure Act had a deleterious effect on
the free market. Id. A special committee established by the SEC to examine the tender
offer process also noted the detrimental effect of regulation of tender offers to the econ-
omy and investors. See Special Report, supra note 93, at 76. State statutes also discourage
arbitrageurs, who play a key role in the implementation of takeovers by providing a market
for stockholders to insure against the possibility that a tender offer may be unsuccessful. See
SEC Rel. No. 34-16384,11979-19801 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,583-84 (Nov.
29, 1979).
See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v.
Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 761 (S.D. Ohio), af'd, 796 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1986), appeal
docketed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 85-344); Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Mari-
etta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 526 (D. Md. 1982); Fischel, supra note 93, at 5, 27-28, 45.
" See Telvest v..Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1983). Expert testimony was
offered to show that Virginia's Take-Over Disclosure Act discouraged investment in Vir-
ginia companies. Id. Cf. Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161, 166 (D. Hawaii 1986). The
Terry court observed that any notion that the Hawaii statute promoted new business in the
state was purely speculative, and no evidence of such was offered. Id. Cf. Special Report,
supra note 93, at 76.
" See L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir. 1985); Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 566, 568 (6th Cir. 1982); Fischel, supra, note 93, at
27. Professor Fischel believes that the additional disclosure requirements mandated by
state law give target management an opportunity to delay the offer through costly lawsuits
that decrease the chances of a tender offer's success. Id. See Langevoort, supra note 50, at
238; Special Report, supra note 93, at 71. Cf. lcahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1416
(W.D. Mo. 1985). The Icahn court noted that governmental regulations which operate
against a bidder's chances for success, or increase his costs, result in fewer takeover bids
being made. Id. But see AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 939 (S.D. Ohio
1979). The Krouse court dismissed the plaintiff's contention that the $100,000 cost to com-
ply with the Ohio statute was overly burdensome in light of the $200,000,000 purchase
Anti-Takeover Statute
A more significant burden imposed by the New York Disclosure
Act is that the state can indirectly block the consummation of a
tender offer.100 If an offeror has set out to obtain a pre-established
percentage of a target company's outstanding shares, and the At-
torney General of New York successfully moves for an injunction
prohibiting the offeror from acquiring shares from New York res-
idents, the offeror's attempt to acquire this pre-determined
amount could be frustrated.101 In such an instance, shareholders
who are residents of states other than New York would be pre-
vented from selling their shares at a premium, and concurrently,
offerors could be deterred from accepting tenders of stock from
other nonresidents.102 Similarly, where an offer could proceed
without any tender of shares by New York resident stockholders,
these in-state residents would be deprived of the opportunity to
sell their shares at a premium, an option available to nonresi-
dents.10 3 One possible result of the statutory scheme would be
price of the target stock. Id.
1*0 See infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
101 See L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 206-07 (6th Cir. 1985). The statute
prevented shareholders domiciled in other states from tendering their shares where the
stock of in-state residents was crucial to a successful completion of the tender offer. Id. at
207. For example, assume tender offeror X sought 51 % of all outstanding shares of target
company Y. Y held 20% of its outstanding stock, New York residents held 40% of the stock
and the remaining 40% was held by shareholders residing in other states. X could fail to
obtain the 5 1 % interest in Y due to the suspension of the tender offer in New York. Id. But
see Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 597 F. Supp. 1493, 1497-98 (D. Minn.), af'd in part,
rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging aforementioned burden statute
imposes, but finding it outweighed by legitimate local interests statute protected). Cardiff
can be distinguished on the basis that Minnesota's Corporate Take-Over Act mandated
compliance only when 20% or more of the target company's shareholders were residents of
the state, see id. The New York Disclosure Act, however, contains no similar provision and
an offeror would be required to comply with the statute's registration provisions even ifjust 50 shareholders of the target company resided in New York. Ch. 915, §4-1601(aX3),
11985] N.Y. Laws 2423 (McKinney). It is submitted that this potential burden on interstate
commerce is more than incidental.
'" Cf. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (stockholders prevented from
tendering their shares at a premium); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,
263 (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986) (state has no interest in protecting
citizens of other states in tenders for their shares); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 161,
166 (D. Hawaii 1986) (statute could bar transactions between stockholders who were not
state residents). Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 761 (S.D. Ohio),
afd, 796 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), appeal docketed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No.
85-344) (statute prevents offeror from buying stock in interstate commerce); Icahn v.
Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (substantial effect to allow state to pre-
vent buying and selling of stock by non-residents).I" See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982); Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d
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that New York could effectively frustrate the transfer of millions
of dollars across state boundaries.104
Closely related to the extraterritorial burden imposed by the
New York Disclosure Act is the combined effect of all state dis-
closure statuteso 5 on cash tender offers. As more states adopt sim-
ilar legislation, an offeror could eventually be required to file up
to fifty different- registration statements, each with its own disclos-
ure requirements.'" The extent to which states could require dis-
closure of information specific to the particular state would be un-
duly burdensome.10 One can only imagine a New York resident
leaving the state, while the offeror is enjoined, to establish resi-
dence in a state with less burdensome disclosure requirements in
order to tender his shares at the premium offered.'" Moreover,
there may be conflicting measures and/or requirements between
two or more state takeover statutes that would effectively block an
offer.' 0' If this were allowed, federal policy would be displaced
576, 580 (4th Cir. 1983): Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 761
(S.D. Ohio), afd, 796 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), appeal docketed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 7,
1986) (No. 85-344); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1416 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
'" See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1284 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub noa. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (state
statute stopped more than $31 million of interstate commerce); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith,
507 F. Supp. 1206, 1224 (D.N.J. 1981) ($160 million dollar tender offer in jeopardy due to
New Jersey statute). One study shows that in 1985, 24 tender offers involved amounts in
excess of $1 billion. See Reed, A Timefor Reflection and a Time to Look Ahead, 20 MERcERS &
AcQuIsMoNs 1, 46 (1986).
105 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 70-85 (Purdon Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-
2-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (Supp. 1986);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West Special Pamphlet 1986).
105 Since many states limit the application of their tender offer statutes to include only
target companies incorporated within that state, an offeror could be required to file a num-
ber of registration statements, since companies often incorporate in more than one state.
See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1264 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub noa. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). Moreover, some
states do not even require that a target company be incorporated within the state before
their statutes become operative. Rather, they require some lesser contact with the state.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01(9) (West Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-20(5)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985) (lesser contact includes principal place of business and substantial
assets within the state or some minimum number of shareholders or percentage of share-
holders who are residents of the state). Id.
107 See supra note 76.
105 See L.P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201, 207 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting possibil-
ity of offeree changing residency in order to tender shares).
1I" See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1284-85 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub noa. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). Several
commentators have suggested that there may be contradictory requirements between dif-
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and become irrelevant.110
An additional interest which the New York Disclosure Act seeks
to secure is promotion of the "long-term growth of New York res-
ident domestic corporations.""' New York sought to assure this
goal through provisions within the statute that would require the
offeror to disclose numerous details on how consummation of the
tender offer would affect New York residents."' While not only
being highly speculative,"18 such disclosure requirements imply an
unarticulated state interest in preventing corporations from mov-
ing assets and employment out of New York." 4 When a state at-
tempts to achieve this end by requiring the disclosure of informa-
tion which discourages cash tender offers, the measure smacks of
economic protectionism. Despite the expressed intent of a statute,
courts will not hesitate in striking down, on Commerce Clause
grounds, state statutes that promote economic balkanization."15
ferent state takeover statutes. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 50, at
228. The Kidwell court, however, was not entirely convinced that there were conflicting
legal requirements between the statutes in question. See Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1284. It
should be noted that the Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein work was written before the deci-
sion in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), and does not reflect any repeals or
amendments to state takeover laws that have since occurred.
1 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion). In noting the
potential of conflicting disclosure requirements, the MITE plurality stated "interstate com-
merce in securities transactions generated by tender offers would be thoroughly stifled."
Id. See also Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1415 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The Icahn court
stated "[tjhe interstate sale of securities on national and regional securities exchanges
would be at the mercy of any state's parochial interests." Id.
I Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 915, N.Y. Laws (December 16, 1985),
reprinted in 119851 N.Y. Laws 2819 (McKinney).
11, Ch. 915, § 4-1603, [19851 N.Y. Laws 2424-27 (McKinney). For additional disclosure
requirements, see supra note 77.
112 See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 764 (S.D. Ohio), arfd,
796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.), appeal docketed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986) (No. 85-
344); cf Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 264 (7th Cir.), prob. juris.
noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986) (no evidence that takeover by offeror would lead to reduction
of employment in Indiana): Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1282 (5th
Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub norm. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173(1979) (maintaining local business could not justify statute); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp.
1400, 1417 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri statute did not assure target company would main-
tain presence within state).
314 Cf Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 264 (Commerce Clause does not allow states to prevent
corporations from moving assets and employees to other states); Icahn, 612 F. Supp. at
1417-18 (protecting state's economic interest conflicts with neutrality policy of Williams
Act).
116 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24, 626-27 (1978); H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
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One particularly burdensome provision of the New York Dis-
closure Act would require an offeror to disclose the "source and
amount of funds," as well as "copies of all loan or credit agree-
ments and letters of commitment" used by the offeror to obtain
financing for the acquisition of the target company.1" This provi-
sion, while closely paralleling section 13(d)(1)(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,1 would also require the offeror to pub-
licly disclose all loans obtained from banks. Under the Williams
Act the offeror has the right to refuse to publicly disclose this
information."1s
The effect of this provision of the New York Disclosure Act is
significant. Lenders may hesitate to make credit available to an
offeror for fear that suspension of the bid may reflect adversely
on the character of the bank?1 Such a result is likely, especial-
ly where civil and criminal prosecution of the borrower is pos-
sible.1 20
The New York Disclosure Act also purports to further New
York's "interest in regulating the relationship among or between
corporations organized in New York." ' 1 It is submitted that this
interest, essentially nothing more than the "internal affairs" doc-
trine, 2 is insufficient to sustain the statute. While the statute only
403-06 (1948): Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935): Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928).Ch. 915, § 4-1603(4), [19851 N.Y. Laws 2424 (McKinney).
"' See The Williams Act, supra note 18, at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1XB). This section re-
quires the disclosure of
the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be used in
making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price is represented or is to be
represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise obtained for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or trading such security, a description of the transac-
tion and the names of the parties thereto, except that where a source of funds is a
loan made in the ordinary course of business by a bank as defined in section 3(a)(6)
of this title, if the person filing such statement so requests, the name of the bank
shall not be made available to the public[.]
Id.
Ile Id.
s See Langevoort, supra note 50, at 239.
120 See ch. 915, § 4-1605, 119851 N.Y. Laws 2427 (McKinney). A willful violation of a
provision in the article is a class E felony, while a willful violation of a rule, order or regula-
tion is a class A misdemeanor. Id. Civil fines for violations are $1,000 per violation for
natural persons and $10,000 per violation for corporations. d.
121 Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in [19851 N.Y. Laws 3189
(McKinney).
'" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 302 comment b (1971). The "in-
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applies to resident target companies, the very nature of a tender
offer is to seek transfers of securities by shareholders to an of-
feror; they do not, as the Supreme Court has held, "implicate the
internal affairs of the target company.18 It is suggested that any
attempt to use the internal affairs doctrine to evade a Commerce
Clause infirmity, especially where the burden on interstate trans-
actions in corporate control and securities is substantial, would
relegate the Commerce Clause to a mere paper tiger in the con-
text of state regulation of tender offers.
Although the New York legislature attempted to draft around
the Edgar v. MITE Corp. decision by limiting the application of the
statute to only New York offerees and New York target compa-
nies, it is suggested that the statute fails to close significant gaps
that pose troublesome questions. While the New York Disclosure
Act avoids any direct burdens on interstate commerce, the indi-
rect regulatory effects imposed present a severe onus not out-
weighed by the interests the statute purports to further.'
CONCLUSION
The New York Disclosure Act has been drafted to avoid any
preemption difficulties. The disclosure required by the statute
serves the interest of investor protection, especially when the
shareholder is also an employee of the target company. 5 Because
of this, the New York Disclosure Act and the Williams Act can
ternal affairs" doctrine protects against a corporation facing the conflicting obligations of
more than one state by providing that only the state with the greatest interest in the sub-
ject matter and the litigants may regulate a corporation's internal affairs. Id.
'" Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (citing Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 n.53 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v.
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)): RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF
LAWS § 302 comment e (1971). See also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d
250, 264 (7th Cir.), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 258 (1986) (internal affairs doctrine does
not save statute): Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742, 762-63 (S.D.
Ohio), a'd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir.), appeal docketed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3231 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1986)
(No. 85-344) (internal affairs doctrine has no application to tender offers); APL Ltd. Part-
nership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1223-24 (D. Minn. 1985) (internal
affairs doctrine has no application to acquisition of stock).
'" United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949). As Justice
Jackson noted: "If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how
local the operation which applies the squeeze." Id.
I" See supra note 77.
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peacefully coexist.
However, the adverse effects of the New York Disclosure Act
on interstate commerce cannot be denied. Several distinct and ex-
cessive burdens exist that threaten the market for corporate con-
trol. Under these circumstances, the prudent path suggests cau-
tion in state regulation. Federal legislation has implemented
sufficient regulation to protect the investor. If a state desires fur-
ther protection of employment opportunities and civic responsibil-
ity within its borders, this legislation should be much more nar-
rowly drawn to effect only those purposes.
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